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SECURITIES EXCHANGE ACT OF 1934 -
SECTION 14(a) - CAUSATION
Mills.v. Electric Auto-Lite Co.,
396 U.S. 375 (1970).
Since the implied private right of action for violations of the fed-
eral securities laws was first recognized by the United States Su-
preme Court in 1. I. Case Co. v. Borak,1 the lower federal courts
have had considerable difficulty in developing the elements2 of such
1377 U.S. 426 (1964). The Borak Court went to the legislative history of the
Securities Exchange Act of 1934 to examine the purpose of section 14(a) [15 U.S.C. §
78n(a) (1964) (hereinafter cited as Exchange Act)], and the SEC proxy rules:
The purpose of § 14(a) is to prevent management or others from obtaining
authorization for corporate action by means of deceptive or inadequate dis-
closure in proxy solicitation. The section stemmed from the congressional
belief that "[flair corporate suffrage is an important right that should attach
to every equity security bought on a public exchange." I.R. Rep. No.
1383, 73d Cong., 2d Sess., 13. It was intended to "control the conditions un-
der which proxies may be solicited with a view to preventing the recurrence of
abuses which... [had] frustrated the free exercise of the voting rights of
stockholders." Id. at 14. "Too often proxies are solicited without explana-
tion to the stockholder of the real nature of the questions for which authority
to cast his vote is sought." S. Rep. No. 792, 73d Cong., 2d Sess., 12. 377
U.S. at 431.
Even though section 14(a) contains no express language authorizing the private right
of action, the Court reasoned that in order to achieve one of the chief purposes of that
section - the protection of investors - the private right of action was implied. Id.
at 432. For an extensive discussion of the history of federal regulation of proxy
solicitations and a detailed examination of the proxy rules, see R. ARANOW & H.
EINHORN, PROXY CONrESTS FOR CORPORATE CONTROL 89-159 (2d ed. 1968).
2 Although SEC Exchange Act Rule 14a-9, 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-9 (1969), which
is basically an antifraud rule, is closely related to the common law action of fraud, not
all the elements of the common law action need be proved to sustain such an action.
Union Pac. R.R. v. Chicago & N.W. Ry., 226 F. Supp. 400, 408 (N.D. IMI. 1964); 3
L Loss, SEcUnmTs REGULATION 1435 (2d ed. 1961). According to Dean Prosser,
the elements of common law fraud are:
(1) A false representation made by the defendant. In the ordinary case, this
representation must be one of fact. (2) Knowledge or belief on the part of
the defendant that the representation is false - or, what is regarded as equiva-
lent, that he has not a sufficient basis of information to make it. This element
is often given the technical name of "scienter." (3) An intention to induce
the plaintiff to act or refrain from action in reliance upon the misrepresenta-
tion. (4) Justifiable reliance upon the representation on the part of the
plaintiff, in taking action or refraining from it. (5) Damage to the plaintiff,
resulting from such reliance. W. PROSSER, TORTS 699-700 (3d ed. 1964).
In securities cases involving proxy statements, courts have generally emphasized three
elements: (1) The misleading information in the proxy statement must be material;
(2) the plaintiff must have relied upon the deficient information; (3) there must be
some causal link between the alleged violation of the proxy rules and the damaging
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an action for violation of the proxy requirements under section 14(a)
of the Securities Exchange Act of 19348 and SEC Rule 14a-9.4 Per-
haps the most difficult element for the courts has been the causation
requirement - the requisite causal relationship between the viola-
tion of the proxy rules and the alleged result of the violation. In
a recent case, Mills v. Electric Auto-Lite Co.,5 the Supreme Court
may have clarified the nature of the causation requirement for sec-
tion 14(a) actions.
Electric Auto-Lite was to be merged into Mergenthaler Lino-
type Company. Auto-Lite's management sent a proxy statement to
all shareholders soliciting their votes for the proposed merger which
was ultimately approved at a shareholders' meeting. Petitioners
claimed that the proxy statement was misleading and that it vio-
lated section 14(a) and Rule 14a-9 because it failed to mention
that Mergenthaler had effective control of Auto-Lite and had nomi-
nated several of Auto-Lite's directors.6  After an unsuccessful at-
tempt at obtaining a court order to delay the vote,7 petitioners Mills
results. See Note, False and Misleading Proxy Statements, 3 GA. L REV. 162, 173-
89 (1968).
3 Section 14 (a) of the Exchange Act, 15 U.S.C. § 78n(a) (1964) provides:
It shall be unlawful for any person, by the use of the mails or by any means or
instrumentality of interstate commerce or of any facility of a national securi-
ties exchange or otherwise, in contravention of such rules and regulations as
the Commission may prescribe as necessary or appropriate in the public in-
terest or for the protection of investors, to solicit or to permit the use of his
name to solicit any proxy or consent or authorization in respect of any secu-
rity (other than an exempted security) registered pursuant to section 12 of this
tide.
4 SEC Exchange Act Rule 14a-9(a) provides:
No solicitation subject to this regulation shall be made by means of any proxy
statement, form of proxy, notice of meeting or other communication, written
or oral, containing any statement which, at the time and in the light of the
circumstances under which it is made, is false or misleading with respect to
any material fact, or which omits to state any material fact necessary in order
to make the statements therein not false or misleading or necessary to cor-
rect any statement in any earlier communication with respect to the solicita-
don of a proxy for the same meeting or subject matter which has become
false or misleading. 17 C.F.R. § 24 0.14a-9(a) (1969).
5 396 U.S. 375 (1970).
6 Mergenthaler owned 54 percent of Auto-Lite's outstanding shares prior to the
merger. Four of Auto-Lite's directors were also directors of Mergenthaler. The Court
of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit pointed out that there was enough information in
the proxy statement to indicate to the shareholders that Auto-Lite's directors were ef-
fectively controlled by Mergenthaler. The court further noted that great emphasis was
placed upon Auto-Lite's directors' recommendations that the merger be approved in the
proxy statement, but little emphasis was placed upon the facts related in the proxy
statement which pointed out the relationship between Auto-Lite's directors and Met-
genthaler. This imbalance in emphasis made the proxy statement misleading for pur-
poses of section 14(a). Mills v. Electric Auto-Lite Co., 403 F.2d 429, 432-35 (7th
Cir. 1968), rev'd, 396 U.S. 375 (1970).
"Petitioners, who were minority shareholders of Auto-Lite, brought an action on
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and Susman, shareholders of Auto-Lite, filed an amended complaint
which sought a declaration that the proxies were void, a dissolution
of the merger, and an accounting to determine damages.
The primary issue facing the Court was the standard to be used
in determining whether the plaintiff had proven the causation ele-
ment of his section 14(a) action.8 The Court of Appeals for the
Seventh Circuit held that the respondent directors had the burden
of persuasion on the causation issue (i.e., whether the defective
proxies caused votes to be cast for the merger) because petitioners
had shown a material defect in the proxy statement and that some
votes needed to accomplish the merger were solicited by respondents.
Noting that the test for the causation element corresponded to the
common law fraud test for reliance, the court reasoned that because
it was not possible to inquire into whether thousands of shareholders
had actually relied on the defect in the proxy statement, respondents
proof of fairness of the merger might justify the conclusion "that
the merger would have received a sufficient vote even if the proxy
statement had not been misleading." 9  Rejecting this reasoning, the
Supreme Court held that fairness was not relevant to the issue of
reliance because "[there is no justification for presuming that the
shareholders of every corporation are willing to accept any and
every fair merger offer."'10 The Supreme Court, however, agreed
the day before the meetin& claiming the proxies acquired through the proxy statement
were void because the proxy statement violated section 14(a) and Rule 14a-9. They
sought an injunction against management's voting of the proxies, but since no tempo-
rary restraining order was requested, the merger was approved at the meeting.
8 The fills Court stated the issue to be decided as follows:
As in Borak the lower courts have found that a corporate merger was accom-
plished through the use of a proxy statement that was materially false or mis-
leading. The question with which we deal is what causal relationship must
be shown between such a statement and the merger to establish a cause of ac-
tion based on the violation of the Act. 396 U.S. at 377.
9 403 F.2d at 436. Given the Seventh Circuit's finding that a plaintiff's showing of
materiality and his meeting the transactional function test would shift to the defendant
the burden of persuasion to show no reliance, two interpretations seem to exist regard-
ing the effect of defendant's showing that the terms of the merger were fair. First,
if defendant produces credible evidence that the terms were fair, he has carried his
case on the reliance question (i.e., by showing fairness he has established an irrebut-
table presumption of -no reliance by the shareholders). Second, if the defendant pro-
duces credible evidence of fairness, he has established something more than a prima
fade case but less than an irrebuttable presumption. Under either interpretation,
if defendant failed to prove fairness and offered no other evidence that the share-
holders did not rely on the proxy statement, plaintiff would prevail because defend-
ant would not have sustained his burden. In light of these possible interpretations
of the Seventh Circuit's opinion, the Supreme Court does not make dear which inter-
pretation is correct.
10 396 U.S. at 382 n.5. The Court's rejection of fairness as a relevant considera.
tion regarding reliance seems consistent with the Seventh Circuit's technique of shift-
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with the Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit that, as a practical
matter, an inquiry into actual reliance is impossible. The Court
further stated that if the plaintiff proves materiality and that the
proxy statement was an essential link in the accomplishment of the
transaction, he has established his section 14(a) action. Implicit in
this holding is that a showing of materiality, plus a showing that
the proxy statement was an essential link, raises a presumption of
reliance on the part of the shareholders or shifts the burden of
persuasion to management to show lack of actual reliance.1
Although the lower federal courts are in general agreement
concerning the elements necessary to plead a proper section 14(a)
cause of action, they have had considerable difficulty in defin-
ing the precise nature of the causation element.12  Perhaps much of
the confusion in this area stems from an overlap of the elements
of reliance and causation, which has resulted in what amounts to a
reliance-causation test. Often, the courts have groped for the ele-
ing the burden of showing no reliance to defendant. Clearly, if actual reliance cannot
be a subject of inquiry, once defendant proved fairness plaintiff would be unable to
rebut such proof by an inquiry into actual reliance. The Court's rejection of the fair-
ness inquiry also recognizes, sub silentio, that a material misrepresentation in a
proxy statement involved in a merger case might relate to matters other than the terms
of the merger.
11396 U.S. at 386. The Court did not specifically reject the Seventh Circuits
burden shifting technique, and, therefore, the assumption that a showing of material-
ity and essential link generates a presumption of reliance could be misplaced. In fact,
the Court apparently recognized the Seventh Circuit's technique by quoting from the
lower court's opinion:
If the respondents could show, "by a preponderance of probabilities, that
the merger would have received a sufficient vote even if the proxy statement
had not been misleading in the respect found," petitioners would be en-
tided to no relief of any kind. 396 U.S. at 380.
However, the Court's language, that on showing materiality and essential link plaintiff
has established his case, lends credence to the possibility that a presumption of re-
liance arises rather than a shifting of the burden of persuasion on that issue. Yet, it is
arguable that the technique of burden shifting essentially means that plaintiff's case
no longer includes the element of reliance once he shows materiality and essential
link. Thus, he has established his case given such a showing, and defendant's case
then includes the burden of proving no reliance. Nevertheless, if a presumption of
reliance does arise, an open question remains whether it is irrebuttable or whether
it will merely stand until defendant offers evidence, other than fairness, that there was
no actual reliance. For a discussion of this question, see text accompanying note 33
infra.
12 In a recent article, Professor Coffey points out the difficulty lower courts have
had with the causation requirement:
The lower courts have generally agreed that no private right for violadon
of the Proxy Rules exists without a claim that the proxy violation prej-
udiced corporate suffrage in some way, and that the violation was related
to the particular item of securityholder business of which plaintiff com-
plains. Beyond this, the courts have struggled to define the causality [reli-
ance) requirement Coffey, Substance of a Borak Right, 2 REv. oF SEc.
REG. 932, 935 (1969).
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ment of reliance under a test termed "causation." A second factor
which has contributed to the confusion is that the courts have not
dearly distinguished reliance-causation from damage-causation."
The judicial inquiry into damage-causation examines whether there
is a causal relationship between the defect in the proxy statement
and the alleged resulting damage to the plaintiff. In contrast, a
reliance-causation test is concerned with whether the outcome of
the vote (i.e., shareholder approval or disapproval) would have
been changed bad the shareholders received the proper information.
Though they have talked in terms of causation, federal courts
have formulated at least three different tests for reliance-causation:
a but for test, a probably dispositive test, and a transactional func-
tion test. Under the first approach the plaintiff must show that
the shareholders would not have approved of a certain action but
for the proxy violation. 4 This test poses the most stringent stand-
ard for the plaintiff. If the proxy solicitors held sufficient voting
control to authorize the corporate action proposed in the proxy
statement, no minority shareholder could later bring a section 14(a)
action because the proposal would have been approved even if the
proxy statement had not been misleading and all the minority share-
holders had voted against it.'5  A second view of the reliance-
causation requirement, as enunciated in Union Pacific R.R. v. Chi-
cago & N.W. Ry.,' 6 would require the plaintiff to demonstrate that
the misleading information probably affected the outcome of the
shareholder vote. The Union Pacific court emphasized that to re-
quire the plaintiff to prove that the violation actually determined
the outcome "would raise insuperable obstacles to relief and nullify
the legislative purpose.'1 7  The third and least stringent test re-
13 E.g., Barnett v. Anaconda Co., 238 . Supp. 766 (S.D.N.Y. 1965). In Barnett,
the court first examined causation in the sense of reliance, i.e., whether the outcome
of the vote was affected by the defect in the proxy statement. Without distinguishing
between the types of causation, the court next inquired whether the defect in the
proxy statement caused the alleged damage. See id. at 771-72.
14 The Barnett court articulated the test as follows:
Here there is no question of fact as to causal relationship between the proxy
material and the transactions under attack. The "but for" element - the
element of causation - does not and, indeed, could not exist. The trans
actions under attack did not result from the issuance of the allegedly mis-
leading proxy material .... Id. at 771.
I 5 Some courts have held that, as a matter of law, no action claiming violation of
section 14(a) can be sustained when the alleged proxy violators had suffident voting
control. See, e.g., Ainsle v. Sandquist, 270 F. Supp. 382 (D. Mass. 1967). But see
Laurenzano v. Einbender, 264 F. Supp. 356 (E.D.N.Y. 1966).
I0 226 F. Supp. 400 (N.D. Ill. 1964).
'7 Id. at 411.
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quires that the proxy deficiency serve some function in the accom-
plishment of the proposed transaction.18  All three of the above
tests, in reality, lend insight into whether the plaintiff relied on the
misinformation contained in the allegedly defective proxy state-
ments. In employing any of these three reliance-causation tests,
the courts are not examining actual reliance, but rather are searching
for a causal link between the defective proxy statement and the
shareholders' exercise of the corporate vote. If such a causal link
is found, the conclusion is that the shareholders must have relied.
Prior to Mills, there was considerable uncertainty in predicting
which reliance-causation test a court would adopt. As a result, the
potential plaintiff had great difficulty in weighing his chances for
success in court because the three tests imposed on him varying bur-
dens of proof. In Mills, however, the Supreme Court dearly
selected a variation of the transaction reliance-causation test which
places the lightest burden of proof on a plaintiff in a section 14(a)
action. The majority opinion stated:
[A] shareholder has made a sufficient showing of causal relation-
ship between the violation and the injury for which he seeks re-
dress, if, as here, he proves that the proxy solicitation itself, rather
than the particular defect in the solicitation materials, was an es-
sential link in the accomplishment of the transaction.' 9
Previously the transaction reliance-causation test required that the
defective language in the proxy statement must have been essential
to the accomplishment of the transaction. 0 However, it is now
dear from the Supreme Court's language that it is the proxy solici-
tation itself, and not the defective language in the proxy statement,
which must be essential to the accomplishment of the transaction.
This new interpretation of the transaction test is more liberal than
the older test, especially if the proxy solicitors do not have self-
sufficient voting control, i.e., insufficient voting control to accom-
plish the transaction without the affirmative votes of the minority
shareholders. Presumably, if the proxy solicitors have to send out
a proxy statement in order to garner sufficient votes, then that
proxy statement must play a vital role in the accomplishment of the
proposed transaction. If, however, the plaintiff had to prove that
18See Laurenzano v. Einbender, 264 F. Supp. 356, 360 (E.D.N.Y. 1966).
19 396 U.S. at 385 (emphasis added).
-
2 0 In Laurenzano v. Binbender, 264 F. Supp. 356 (E.D.N.Y. 1966), the court stated
that in order for the requisite causation to be shown "the accused proxy material [i.e.,
the defect in the proxy statement] . . . [must] have a transactional function and
not merely be randomly present in the context of the transaction with respect to which
aremedy is sought." Id. at 360 (emphasis added).
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a particular statement in the misleading proxy solicitation was sig-
nificant to the accomplishment of the transaction, his burden would
be more difficult. In the context of the Mills facts, the plaintiff
would have had to show that the deemphasis of the control of Auto-
Lite by Mergenthaler was significant in accomplishing the proposed
merger - certainly a more difficult task than merely showing that
the proxy statement itself was necessary to accomplish the proposed
merger between Auto-Lite and Mergenthaler.
A more difficult situation for the plaintiff under the liberalized
test arises where the solicitors have sufficient voting control to ac-
complish the proposed transaction without the votes of the minority
shareholders. If the solicitors send out a deficient proxy statement,
could any minority shareholder meet the requirements of the Mills
essential link test? Initially, it would seem that the plaintiff could
not show that the proxy statement was an essential link in the ac-
complishment of the proposed transaction because the proxy solici-
tors do not need any votes to have the transaction approved. But
such a result is inconsistent with the purpose of section 14(a) as
cited by the Supreme Court in Mills - the protection of fair and
informed corporate suffrage.21  Even where proxy solicitors have
majority control, a deficient proxy statement violates the minority
shareholders' right to exercise their corporate votes upon fairly and
fully disclosed information. Further, the Mills Court alluded to
the possibility that a plaintiff may be successful even where the solic-
itors have majority control.22 This suggestion that the solicitors'
majority control may not preclude the plaintiff from meeting the
requirements of the essential link test finds some support in
Laurenzano v. Einbender.23 The justification for this suggestion is
that the proxy statement is not necessarily without purpose merely
because the minority shareholders' votes are not needed. It may
be that the solicitors seek a consensus or tranquility among the mi-
nority shareholders. 2  Thus, relying upon the congressional policy
21 396 U.S. at 381.
22 Id. at 385 n.7.
23 264 F. Supp. 356 (E.D.N.Y. 1966).
24 As the court in Laurenzano said:
It is nor, however, to be assumed without evidence that the solicitation of
proxies was a gratuitous and, therefore, purposeless and legally inert act.
It may be that an unfavorable vote from the minority stockholders would
have brought about modification or reconsideration of the transactions; in
corporate circles, consensus can be a desideratum. It may be that a value
was perceived and sought in just such a favorable vote as was obtained from
the one-quarter of the minority stockholders who mailed in their proxies.
Such seemingly pointless approbations have their uses, and even the record
19701
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underlying section 14(a) and the Laurenzano rationale, a plaintiff
may be able to meet the Mills essential link standard even where
the solicitors have majority control as long as the proxy statement
served some purpose with respect to the transaction.
In delineating the nature of the reliance-causation test, the Mills
Court made it clear that the question of causation is irrelevant until
the plaintiff establishes materiality.2 5 Although the issue of mate-
riality was not before the Court, it is significant that in choosing
among the three available tests for materiality, the Court selected
the most liberal. According to the Court, when considering the
issue of materiality, the trier of fact must determine whether there is
a sufficient relationship between the defect in the proxy statement
and the matter to be voted upon (whereas the essential link test
requires a sufficient relationship between the proxy statement - not
the defect in the statement - and the resulting exercise of the cor-
porate vote). Prior to the Mills decision, there were at least three
materiality tests available to the lower federal courts. The first test
requires that the representation or omission must be "one that would
influence the stockholder's vote."2  The second and third tests ap-
pear in Richland v. Crandall.27  There the court announced a varia-
tion of the first test in that the alleged misrepresentation or omis-
sion "would normally be expected to influence a reasonable stock-
holder in voting."28  The Richland court, however, in restating this
test later in the opinion seemed to vary it enough to provide the pos-
sibility of a third test which would ask whether the solicitors incor-
porated those facts into the proxy statement "that a stockholder
might reasonably need in order to make an intelligent decision with
respect to the proposal. ' 2 9 It is apparent from a comparison of the
language of these tests that the third test, where the plaintiff-
of disclosure itself may serve a range of useful, purposes. Although the
proxy solicitation was not a necessary or indispensable ingredient of the ex-
ecution of the transactions, it was calculatedly infused into the matrix of the
transactions; it cannot now be said as a matter of law that the solicitation
was not an integral part of the transactions and that it was functionless in
the consummation of the transactions. Id. at 361-62.
25 The Court stated that where a court finds materiality, the shareholder meets the
causation test by showing that the proxy solicitation was an essential link in the ac-
complishment of the transaction. 396 U.S. at 385.
26 Miller v. Steinbach, 268 F. Supp. 255, 274 (S.D.N.Y. 1967) (emphasis added);
Evans v. Armour & Co., 241 F. Supp. 705, 709 (E.D. Pa. 1965).
27 262 F. Supp. 538 (S.D.N.Y. 1967).
28 Id. at 553 (emphasis added).
29 Id. (emphasis added). Curiously, when the Richland court reiterated the mate-
riality test that it considered appropriate, its test seemed to become more liberal in that
"would" was replaced by "might."
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shareholder is required only to show that he did not have all the
information he might reasonably have needed in order to cast an
intelligent vote, is the most favorable to the plaintiff. The mate-
riality standard adopted by the Mills Court closely resembles this
third test in that "the defect [must be) of such a character that it
might have been considered important by a reasonable shareholder
who was in the process of deciding how to vote.' '80  In articulating
this standard the Court emphasized that requiring "the defect [to)
have a significant propensity to affect the voting process . . . ade-
quately serves the purpose of ensuring that a cause of action cannot
be established by proof of a defect so trivial, or so unrelated to the
transaction for which approval is sought, that correction of the de-
fect or imposition of liability would not further the interests pro-
tected by § 14(a)." 3' The Court's use of "so trivial" and "so un-
related" suggests that its materiality test is to be construed very
expansively"2 in order to give maximum protection to corporate
suffrage rights. Thus, the Court's rationale for choosing a liberal
materiality test is consistent with its liberalization of the transac-
tion test.
Such an expansive reading of the Mills materiality test, however,
is likely to lead to problems in future cases because the Court failed
to establish standards by which lower courts might determine when
a misstatement or omission is so trivial or so unrelated to the pro-
posed transaction that it falls short of being material. In deciding
these difficult cases, the lower federal courts should not retreat
from the liberal posture adopted by Mills. Particularly in the proxy
area, as distinguished from the purchase and sale of securities con-
text,"8 does it appear desirable to employ as liberal a materiality test
as is possible. Unlike the purchaser or seller of securities, a share-
holder who is called upon to exercise his corporate vote has no
choice in the matter. Once a vote is set down by the directors, the
shareholder must vote. Thus, because management is responsible
38 396 U.S. at 384 (emphasis added).
81 Id.
3 2 Some support for the suggestion that the Mills Court intended its materiality
test to be expansively construed can be found in a foomote comment. The material
misstatement or omission need not be so material that the shareholders would have
voted differently; it need be material enough only to constitute a "thwarting [of] the
informed decision at which the statute aims .... " 396 U.S. at 384 n.6.
33 Fraud also poses problems in the area of purchase and sale of securities. Section
10(b) of the Exchange Act, 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (1964), covers this area and provides
that it shall be unlawful to use any device in the purchase or sale of a security
which contravenes the rules promulgated by the SEC pursuant to the section.
1970]
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for placing the shareholder in this position, it is arguable that more
stringent requirements should be imposed upon management in
complying with the proxy rules. Moreover, such a standard has the
salutary effect of further promoting the policy of informed cor-
porate suffrage.
A question left unanswered by the Mills decision is whether a
defendant can ever rebut the presumption of reliance which may
arise if the plaintiff meets the requirements of the materiality and
essential link tests. It would seem that if the defendant could prove
that the plaintiff did not actually rely upon the proxy statement, the
presumption of reliance would be rebutted.84 Such a rebuttal would
conclusively demonstrate that the defective material had no effect
on the exercise of the corporate vote. Perhaps, the defendant could
prove no actual reliance by showing that all shareholders had re-
ceived a letter from the management which corrected the proxy state-
ment's material misstatement or omission.
Another question which did not directly confront the Mills
Court was the nature of the relief available to the plaintiff who
has met the Court's materiality and essential link standards. The
Supreme Court stated that the plaintiff is entitled to equitable relief
after meeting the liberal standards established in Mills.8 As a practi-
cal matter, once a merger has been partially or fully consummated,
it is unlikely that a court would attempt the difficult task of un-
scrambling the merger.36 Because it is too late to enjoin the vote
on or the consumation of the merger at this point, the plaintiff may
find that no equitable relief is available. But are any other forms
of relief available? The Mills Court suggests that monetary relief
can be obtained if, in addition to satisfying the materiality and
8 4 The Supreme Court may have raised a presumption of reliance after stating
that as a practical matter, the issue of actual reliance usually cannot be examined.
See text accompanying note 11 supra. Therefore, if in a given case proof can be
offered by defendant showing no actual reliance, the presumption should be effectively
rebutted. In rejecting the Seventh Circuit's comment that fairness of the merger
terms is relevant to reliance, the Court gave no indication that some other proof
would also be irrelevant to reliance.
35 The Court reiterated its position taken in Borak - that the lower federal
courts were to provide all equitable relief necessary to effectuate the congressional
purpose of protection of corporate suffrage rights. Such zelief is not limited to
prospective relief only, but can include setting aside the merger. 396 U.S. at 386.
36The majority opinion cited Hecht Co. v. Bowles, 321 U.S. 321, 329-30 (1944),
for the proposition that in determining the issue of equitable relief, the court must
balance the claims and rights of the competing parties. 396 U.S. at 386. Presum-
ably, if unscrambling the consummated merger would impose upon the defendants
and the corporations involved a hardship which outweighed the plaintiff's interest
(ie., protection of his corporate suffrage rights under section 14 (a)), then the mer-
ger will stand even though there has been violation of the proxy rules.
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essential link requirements, the plaintiff meets a test of damage-
causation. The damage-causation test articulated by the Supreme
Court in Mills is more liberal than any such tests which existed
previously. 7 Nevertheless, money damages are recoverable only to
the extent that they can be proven.88 Thus, if a plaintiff has passed
the point at which equitable relief is no longer available and cannot
prove actual damages, he may be unable to obtain any meaningful
relief. Perhaps it was in recognition of this potential lack of avail-
able relief and the chilling effect which this might have on the
initiation of suits claiming proxy rule violations that the Mills
Court held the recovery of reasonable attorney's fees was appro-
priate in a section 14(a) action. 9
The Mills decision also may have an impact in the area of Rule
10b-540 due to the unique interrelationship between Rule 10b-5
and the proxy rules in the merger context. Because it has been held
that a merger may constitute a "purchase or sale" within the mean-
3 7 For a statement of the more stringent damage-causation test prior to Mills, see
Barnett v. Anaconda Co., 238 F. Supp. 766 (S.D.N.Y. 1965), wherein the court said:
"It is generally the rule that civil liability is implied from violation of a legislative
enactment only when the injury claimed has been caused by that violation." Id. at
771-72 (emphasis added). Thus, to meet the test of damage-causation, plaintiff pre-
viously had to prove that the violation was directly related to the injurious conse-
quences. But now, according to the Mills Court, the violation of the proxy rules
need not directly cause the resulting injury. Plaintiff need only show that some fi-
nancial injury occurred - not that the defective language of the proxy statement was
directly related to that injury. The Court further suggests that in the rather com-
plex merger context, the fairness of the merger may be determinative of the question
of damages. 396 U.S. at 389.
38Id.
39 As Mr. Justice Harlan stated for the majority:
Whether petitioners are successful in showing a need for significant relief
may be a factor in determining whether a further award should be later made.
But regardless of the relief granted, private stockholders' actions of this
sort . . . furnish a benefit to all shareholders by providing an important
means of enforcement of the Proxy statute. 396 U.S. at 396 (emphasis
added) (citation omitted).
It is apparent from the Court's language that the rationale, in part, for allowing
recovery of attorney's fees is to stimulate private enforcement of section 14(a) and the
proxy rules.
40 SEC Exchange Act Rule 10b-5 provides that:
It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, by the use of any
means or instrumentality of interstate commerce, or of the mails, or of any
facility of any national securities exchange,
(1) to employ any device, scheme or artifice to defraud,
(2) to make any untrue statement of a material fact or to omit to state
a material fact necessary in order to make the statements made, in light of
the circumstances under which they were made, not misleading or
(3) to engage in any act, practice or course of business which operates or
would operate as a fraud or deceit upon any person, in connection with the
purchase or sale of any security. 17 C.F.R. § 240-10b-5 (1969)
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ing of Rule 10b-5,41 under a given set of facts a plaintiff-shareholder
may be entitled to sue under both the proxy rules and Rule lob-5.
If a deficient proxy statement in the merger context can give rise to
actions under both Rules 14a-9 and lob-5, the plaintiff may rely
more on his 14a-9 action if his chances of success seem better under
that Rule than under 10-5. Although the reliance-causation ele-
ment in the 10b-5 area is still a somewhat confused notion,42 pre-
sumably, after the Mills decision, there will be some uniformity in
the application of the reliance-causation element in the 14a-9 area. A
uniformly applied test should provide better information to the
plaintiff upon which he can gauge his chances for success.
The Supreme Court in Mills emphasized the broad policy con-
sideration underlying section 14(a) and Rule 14a-9 - protection
of informed corporate suffrage. To effect this protection, the Court
liberalized the reliance-causation test, enunciated an expansive test
for materiality, and raised a presumption of reliance on the part of
the shareholders. Corporate suffrage received further protection
from the Court when it provided for the award of attorney's fees in
order to stimulate private enforcement of the proxy rules.
The effect of the Mills decision has been to lighten the burden
of the shareholder who seeks to enjoin a corporate vote43 or the
consummation of a merger,44 and it has even clarified somewhat
the task of a plaintiff who seeks to unscramble a merger or to
obtain actual monetary relief. It remains the task of the lower
federal courts, however, to give full weight to the spirit of Mills by
liberally construing the materiality and essential link tests. In
doing so, they should approach the proxy statement area with the
same concern for the protection of corporate suffrage rights evi-
denced by the Mills Court. Nowhere can the lower federal courts
contribute more to the spirit of Mills than in the open area where the
solicitors of proxies have sufficient voting control to accomplish
the proposed transaction without the votes of the minority share-
41 SEC v. National Securities, Inc., 393 U.S. 453 (1969).
42 See A. BROMBERG, SEcURITIES LAW: FuUD: SEC RULE 10b-5 §§ 8.7(1)-(2)
(1969).
4 3 The lower court in Mills pointed out that if a plaintiff could establish, prior to
the shareholders' meeting, that a proxy statement contained a material defect, in-junctive relief would be appropriate then without showing more. 403 F.2d at 435.
In light of the expansive materiality test adopted by the Supreme Court in Mills,
injunctive relief prior to the meeting is now even more readily available.
44 Once a corporate vote on a proposed merger has been held and the merger ap-
proved, it would seem that, prior to consummation, the equitable relief to which a
plaintiff would be entitled, on showing materiality and essential link, would include
enjoining the consummation of the merger. See 396 U.S. at 386.
